1 See Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, Belg.-Den.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Greece-Ir.-Italy-Lux.-Neth.-Port.-Spain-U.K., 31 I.L.M. 247, 259 (1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Community (EC) into the EU. The objectives of the EU are consistent with those of the EC. See id. art. B.
2 See Ricou Heaton, The European Community After 1992: The Freedom of Movement of People and Its Limitations, 25 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 643, 647–48 (1992).
3 See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts—Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Protocol integrating the Schengen aquis into the framework of the European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 2, 93 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
4 See Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders and the Convention Applying the Agreement, June 14, 1985, Belg.-Fr.-F.D.R.-Lux.-Neth., 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991). The agreement was originally signed by France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Id. This agreement consists of two parts: the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Convention Applying the Agreement. See id. For the purposes of this Note, “the Schengen Agreement” refers to the document in its entirety and “the Convention” refers to the latter portion of the document.
5 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 4. The agreement was named after the town in Luxembourg where it was signed. See Heaton, supra note 2, at 656.
6 See Eric Thomas Berkman, Sacrificed Sovereignty?: Dutch Soft Drug Policy in the Spectre of Europe without Borders, 19 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 173, 176–77 (1996). See also Henk van Vliet, The Uneasy Decriminalization: A Perspective on Dutch Drug Policy, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 717 (1990).
7 See Dirk J. Korf, Dutch Treat 48 (1995); C.M. Ottevanger, Drug Policy and Drug Tourism, in Schengen, Judicial Cooperation and Policy Coordination 165, 176 (Monica den Boer ed., 1997); A.M. van Kalmthout, Characteristics of Drug Policy in the Netherlands, in Drug Policies in Western Europe 259, 262 (Hans-Jörg Albrecht & Anton van Kalmthout eds., 1989).
8 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
9 Id. art. 8.
10 See id. art. 8a.
11 Id.
12 See The Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987) [hereinafter SEA]. The SEA reads, in pertinent part: “The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.” Id. at 747. See also Heaton, supra note 2, at 644, 647.
13 See Heaton, supra note 2, at 647–48.
14 See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 3. Ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam does not force open borders because, by incorporating the Schengen Agreement, Article 2(2) of the Convention relating to border controls for public policy or national security reasons is also incorporated. See id.; Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2); infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
15 See Joined Cases C-65/95 and C-111/95, The Queen v. Secretary of the State for the Home Dept., ex parte Mann Singh Shingara and Abbas Radiom, 1997 E.C.R. I-3343, 3354 n.9 (finding United Kingdom’s border control measures valid because Schengen Agreement is not matter of Community law).
16 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17 Schengen Agreement, supra note 4, at Introductory Note. See Berkman, supra note 6, at 176; Heaton, supra note 2, at 654; Julian J.E. Schutte, Schengen: Its Meaning for the Free Movement of Persons in Europe, 28 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 549, 549–50 (1991).
18 See Schutte, supra note 17, at 550.
19 Convention, supra note 4, at 84.
20 See Schengen Agreement, supra note 4, at Introductory Note.
21 See Schutte, supra note 17, at 549.
22 See id. Since the original agreement, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have joined the agreement. See Anne Van Lancker, Transparency and Accountability of Schengen, in Schengen, Judicial Cooperation and Policy Coordination, supra note 7, at 61, 62 & n.3.
23 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. See also Heaton, supra note 2, at 664; Schutte, supra note 17, at 552.
24 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2). See also Schutte, supra note 17, at 552. Article 2 of the 1990 Schengen Convention provides, in pertinent part:
1. Internal borders may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons being carried out.
2. Where public policy or national security so require, however, a Contracting Party may, after consulting with other Contracting Parties, decide that for a limited period national border checks appropriate to the situation will be carried out at internal borders. If public policy or national security require immediate action, the Contracting Party concerned shall take the necessary measures and shall inform the other Contracting Parties thereof at the earliest opportunity.
3. The abolition of checks on persons at internal borders shall not affect . . . the exercise of police powers by the competent authorities under each Contracting Party’s legislation throughout its territory . . . .
Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
25 See id. art. 2(2). See also Van Lancker, supra note 22, at 63.
26 See Van Lancker, supra note 22, at 63.
27 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See Korf, supra note 7, at 46–47. See, e.g., H.J. Albrecht, Drug Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Drug Policies in Western Europe, supra note 7, at 175, 177–79; E. Boutmans, The Situation in Belgium, in Drug Policies in Western Europe, supra note 7, at 89, 89–90; J. Bernat de Celis, France’s Policy Convening Illegal Drug Users, in Drug Policies in Western Europe, supra note 7, at 143, 144–47.
31 Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 166.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 178–79; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724.
35 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 177; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724.
36 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724.
37 See id. at 727.
38 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 165. Ottevanger briefly compares the prohibition of soft drugs to the prohibition of alcohol with reference to the 1920s Prohibition Era in the United States which is believed to have resulted in the growth of organized crime, illegal jobs and corruption among public officials. See id. at 165–66.
39 See Korf, supra note 7, at 44; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 725.
40 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 166–67.
41 See Dick C. Kaasjager & Marcel de Kort, Mutual Influences between National Drugs Policies in Europe, in Schengen, Judicial Cooperation and Policy Coordination, supra note 7, at 181, 185; Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168.
42 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168; Berkman, supra note 6, at 179.
43 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168; Berkman, supra note 6, at 179; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 731.
44 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724–25.
45 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 167–68.
46 See van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 264.
47 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 178–79.
48 See id. at 179. See also van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724.
49 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 727. See also Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 166–67; van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 263.
50 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168; van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 271–77.
51 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 725.
52 See van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 261; Berkman, supra note 6, at 177; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 722.
53 See van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 261.
54 See id. at 261–62; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 722–23.
55 See van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 262; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724. See also Korf, supra note 7, at 43–45.
56 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 731.
57 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 168. The guidelines include prohibitions against the sale of hard drugs and any sale to juveniles, as well as prohibitions against advertising. See id.
58 See van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 266; Berkman, supra note 6, at 178–79.
59 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 171, 176.
60 See id. at 171.
61 See id. at 176.
62 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 744.
63 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 171, 176.
64 See Written Question No. 118/92 by Mr. Gerd Müller (PPE) to the Commission of the European Communities, 1992 O.J. (C 281) 15, 15 [hereinafter Written Question No. 118/92]; Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 174–76.
65 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 174–76.
66 See Heaton, supra note 2, at 645.
67 See Written Question No. 118/92, supra note 64.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See Report of Partial Lifting of French Border Checks—General and Political Affairs—Freedom of Movement—Background Information, Eur. Rep. 2119/IV/8 (1996), available in LEXIS, International Law Library, Spicers file [hereinafter Report 2119/IV/8]; General and Political Affairs—Freedom of Movement—Background Information, Eur. Rep. 1873/I/1 (1993), available in LEXIS, International Law Library, Spicers file [hereinafter Report 1873/I/1]; Kaasjager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 185; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 741.
71 See Convention, supra note 4, at 116–18.
72 See id.
73 See id. See also Korf, supra note 7, at 48.
74 See Boutmans, supra note 30, at 89–90; de Celis, supra note 30, at 145–47; Kaasjager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 185; Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 166. See also Korf, supra note 7, at 46–47. For example, France prescribes two to ten years imprisonment for the production/cultivation of cannabis, whereas the majority of Western European nations cap their penalties at five years or less, absent some other criteria (i.e., recidivism or commercial intent). See Korf, supra note 7, at 46–47. Furthermore, France sets a penalty of two to ten years for the mere possession of cannabis in contrast to others whose penalties range from one month to five years, again, except when certain other criteria are present. See id.
75 See id. at 46.
76 See id. at 46–47.
77 See Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70; Report 1873/I/1, supra note 70; Schutte, supra note 17, at 557–58.
78 See Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70; Report 1873/I/1, supra note 70. See also Kaasjager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 185.
79 See Van Lancker, supra note 22, at 62. Spain joined the Schengen Agreement after the initial signing. See id.
80 Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70.
81 See id. See also Schutte, supra note 17, at 550.
82 See Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70; Report 1873/I/1, supra note 70. See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 741.
83 Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70.
84 See id.
85 See Berkman, supra note 6, at 180–82.
86 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 737.
87 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 169. Studies show that, in comparison to many other EU nations, the Netherlands has fewer AIDS sufferers and a significantly lower rate of drug-related deaths. See id. at 169–73.
88 See id.
89 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 728.
90 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 170.
91 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 747–48.
92 See id. See also Korf, supra note 7, at 46–47.
93 See Korf, supra note 7, at 47–49.
94 See Kaasjager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 188.
95 See id. at 186–87.
96 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 743–44.
97 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 177.
98 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 744.
99 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 176.
100 See Korf, supra note 7, at 48; Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 176; van Kalmthout, supra note 7, at 262.
101 See Korf, supra note 7, at 60. See also Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 171, 176.
102 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 731.
103 See id. See also Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 171, 176.
104 See id.
105 See Ottevanger, supra note 7, at 171, 176.
106 Schengen Agreement, supra note 4, at 68. The title of the agreement is the “Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders” (emphasis added). See id.
107 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2).
108 Id.
109 See Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70; Report 1873/I/1, supra note 70; Berkman, supra note 6, at 177; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724.
110 See generally Schengen Agreement, supra note 4.
111 See Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2).
112 See van Vliet, supra note 6, at 724 (Dutch drug policy adopted in 1976, nine years before Schengen Agreement); see also Kaasjager & de Kort, supra note 41, at 185.
113 See Report 2119/IV/8, supra note 70; van Vliet, supra note 6, at 743–44.
114 See Schutte, supra note 17, at 549.
115 See id.
116 See Van Lancker, supra note 22, at 64 (reference to France finding several “security” reasons not to fully implement the Schengen Agreement).