* Articles Editor, 1999-2000, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review.
1 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (1994); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (1994); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (1994); see also Robert L. Rossi, Attorneys’ fees § 10:34, at 696 (2d ed. 1995).
2 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, §  304(d), 42 U.S.C. §  7604(d); Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, § 7002(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e); Safe Drinking Water Act, § 1449(d), 42 U.S.C. §  300j-8(d); Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, § 326(f), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(f).
3 See Michael D. Axline, Environmental Citizen Suits §  8.03, 8–2 (1995).
4 See id.
5 See, e.g., Brief for Defendant, Citizens for a Better Env’t v. The Steel Co., No. 95-C-4534 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Steel Co. Brief].
6 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994).
7 See Jeffrey G. Miller & Environmental Law Institute, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws §  9–4, 102 (1987).
8 See Christiansburg v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976); see also, Axline, supra note 3, at 8–14.
9 Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421.
10 See generally Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5.
11 See Sierra Club v. Shell Oil, 817 F.2d 1169, 1176 (5th Cir. 1987).
12 See George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen Standing in Environmental Cases, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,028 (1999).
13 See Axline, supra note 3, at 1–2; Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, Part I, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,309, 10,309 (1983) [hereinafter Private Enforcement].
14 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,309.
15 See Miller, supra note 7, at 1.
16 See Van Cleve, supra note 12, at 10,028.
17 See Walter B. Russell, III & Paul Thomas Gregory, Awards of Attorneys’ Fees in Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the “Appropriate” Standard, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 307, 324–25 (1984).
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id. at 325.
22 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 325 n.83.
23 See id. 325.
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (1994).
25 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1994).
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (1994).
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (1994).
28 See Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and Judicial Interpretation: First Time Tragedy, Second Time Farce, 20 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 311, 313–14 (1998). Other lesser known environmental statutes also contain such a provision, including the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (1994), and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (1994).
29 See Snook, supra note 28, at 314; see also CAA, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d).
30 See Snook, supra note 28, at 314. The result is that in some cases, citizens have the ability to enforce more provisions of acts than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310. For example, citizens have the ability to enforce more provisions of RCRA than EPA. See id.
31 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,309; see also CAA, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. §  7604(d) (1994).
32 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310.
33 See Snook, supra note 28, at 315.
34 See id. at 316.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See Conservation Law Found. v. Browner, 840 F. Supp. 171, 174 (D. Mass. 1993); Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310.
38 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310; Snook, supra note 28, at 316.
39 See Snook, supra note 28, at 316.
40 See Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d); Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310.
41 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id. The attorneys’ fees award provision is discussed in Section II, infra.
45 See id.
46 See Van Cleve, supra note 12, at 10,028.
47 See id. This feature in American environmental law distinguishes it from the less successful programs in other countries, which involve little to no citizen participation. See id.
48 Id.
49 Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979).
50 Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
51 See Amicus Brief at 17, Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 182 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-15788) [hereinafter Murrelet Amicus Brief].
52 S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985).
53 See 136 Cong. Rec. S3180 (1990) (“Citizen resources are an important adjunct to governmental action to assure that these laws are adequately enforced. In a time of limited governmental resources, enforcement through court action prompted by citizen suits is a valuable dimension of environmental law.”).
54 See Private Enforcement, supra note 13, at 10,310.
55 See Murrelet Amicus Brief, supra note 51, at 30.
56 See Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co., 885 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
57 See id.
58 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–2.
59 See Lana Knedlik, Comment, Attorneys’ Fees in Private Party Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA: The Key Tronic Decision, 44 U. Kan. L. Rev. 365, 370 (1996).
60 See id. at 371.
61 See Kanad S. Virk, General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc., Are Attorneys’ fees Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost Recovery Actions?, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1541, 1544 (1991).
62 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); see also Virk, supra note 61, at 1544.
63 See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the American Rule in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, indicating that in the United States, the prevailing litigant ordinarily is not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser. See 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
64 See Dean R. Nicyper, Note, Attorneys’ Fees and Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: Discouraging Citizens from Challenging Administrative Agency Decisions, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 775, 784 (1984).
65 See Virk, supra note 61, at 1544.
66 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 784.
67 See id. at 785, 787; see also Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247–49.
68 See Knedlik, supra note 59, at 371; see also Richards M. Stephens, The Fees Stop Here: Statutory Purposes Limit Awards to Defendants, 36 DePaul L. Rev. 489, 489–90 (1987); Nicyper, supra note 64, at 785.
69 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 785 & n.63.
70 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
71 See Knedlik, supra note 59, at 371; see also Stephens, supra note 68, at 489–90; Nicyper, supra note 64, at 785.
72 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 785–86.
73 See Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (serving as private attorney general benefits others and entitles plaintiff to fees), aff’d, 409 U.S. 942 (1972); see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
74 See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 240.
75 See 421 U.S. at 264; see also Stephens, supra note 68, at 491–92.
76 See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 264.
77 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 787.
78 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983).
79 See id.
80 See id.; Axline, supra note 3, at 8–2.
81 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 684.
82 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–2.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 Clean Air Act, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994).
86 See id.; Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 309.
87 See Newman, 390 U.S. at 402; Miller, supra note 7, at 103.
88 See Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
89 See Miller, supra note 7, at 102 & n.45.
90 See id at 102.
91 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 307.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 332; see also Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that it is “appropriate” to make awards of attorneys’ fees without regard to the outcome of the litigation when it serves the public interest); Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that the dominant consideration is whether litigation by that party has served the public interest).
95 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 332–33.
96 See 463 U.S. at 682. This was a 5–4 decision in which Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and O’Connor. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined.
97 See id. at 681. In the original suit, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Sierra Club challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) promulgated standards limiting the emission of sulfur dioxide by coal-burning power plants. See id. EDF argued that the standards promulgated by the EPA were tainted by the agency’s ex parte contacts with representatives of private industry, while the Sierra Club contended that EPA lacked authority under the CAA to issue the type of standards that it did. See id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected all the claims made by EDF and the Sierra Club. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
98 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 680–82; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (1994).
99 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.
100 See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 684 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
101 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.
102 See id. at 686.
103 See id. at 686–94; see also Nicyper, supra note 64, at 797.
104 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 692–93.
105 See id.
106 See id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. See id.
107 See id. at 694.
108 See id. at 703–05.
109 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 704.
110 See id at 712.
111 See id.
112 Id. at 681–83; see also Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 344.
113 See 463 U.S. at 682 n.1.
114 See id. at 688.
115 See id.
116 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 311.
117 See Ruckleshaus, 463 U.S. at 683; Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 311.
118 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8-3.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 (1983).
122 Id. at 434.
123 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–8.
124 See id. at 14.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See Axline, supra note 3, at 14.
129 434 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1978).
130 See, e.g., Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 3.
131 See E. Richard Larson, Federal Court Awards of Attorneys’ Fees 85–97 (1981).
132 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–1.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 8–2.
135 See id. at 8–3.
136 See id. at 8–2–8–3.
137 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 326–27.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 327.
141 See id.
142 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973).
143 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 327.
144 See David Berger, Court Awards of Attorneys’ fees: Litigating Antitrust, Civil Rights, Public Interest and Securities Cases—Prevailing Party Concepts in Court Awards of Attorneys’ Fees, 324 PLI/Lit. 41, 77 (1987).
145 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–14; Miller, supra note 7, at 108; Berger, supra note 144, at 77.
146 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
147 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–14 n.64.
148 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418.
149 See id.
150 Id.; see Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
151 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418.
152 See id. at 418–19.
153 See id. at 415. Section 706(k) states that “[i]n any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee. . . .” § 706(k), 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(k) (1994).
154 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 415.
155 See id. at 415.
156 See id. at 420–21.
157 Id. at 420 (1978).
158 Id.
159 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420.
160 See id. at 418.
161 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 358.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418–419.
165 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8-8; Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 329.
166 See Nicyper, supra note 64, at 798.
167 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 514-17.
168 See generally Nicyper, supra note 64.
169 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418–19.
170 See Berger, supra note 144, at 77–78.
171 See Miller, supra note 7, at 98.
172 See id.
173 See id. at 108.
174 See S. Rep. No. 91–1196, at 36–39 (1970); Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 436–39 (1972) (hereinafter CAA70 Leg. Hist.). The Senate report stated:
Concern was expressed that some lawyers would use Section 304 to bring frivolous and harassing actions. The Committee has added a key element in providing that the courts may award costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, whenever the court determines that such action is in the public interest. The court could thus award costs of litigation to defendants where the litigation was obviously frivolous or harassing. This should have the effect of discouraging abuse of this provision, while at the same time encouraging the quality of the actions that will be brought.
S. Rep. No. 91–1196, at 36–39.
175 See Miller, supra note 7, at 98. As one can see from the above quote, this change was not mentioned in the conference report, and the analysis continued to explain the standard as “in the public interest.” Id. at 99.
176 See S. Rep. No. 91–1196, at 36–39 (1970); CAA70 Leg. Hist., supra note 174, at 436–39.
177 Id.
178 See id.
179 See CAA70 Leg. Hist., supra note 174, at 280–81 (Statement of Sen. Muskie).
180 See Miller, supra note 7, at 108.
181 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523 (1994); Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
182 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
183 See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 523.
184 See id.
185 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–14 n.64.
186 See Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 Duke L.J. 435, 449; see also Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028–29 (2d Cir. 1979) (awarding $200 attorneys’ fee to defendant due to defendant’s financial distress); Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 709 F.2d 807, 814 (2d. Cir. 1983) (awarding defendant fees because it was “a non-profit association comprised primarily of members who earn their living with their hands”).
187 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–14 n.64.
188 See generally Christiansburg v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See generally Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5.
192 See id. The original case was decided by the Supreme Court on March 4, 1998, which held that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and thus dismissed the case. See Citizens for a Better Environment v. The Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1009–1021 (1998). The Supreme Court held that the citizens “lack[ed] standing to maintain [the] suit and we and the lower courts lack jurisdiction to entertain it.” Id. at 1021. Thus, although the plaintiffs won in the Seventh Circuit, the defendants were ultimately the prevailing party, but on jurisdictional grounds, not on the merits. See id. The defendants violated the federal Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) for seven years. See id. at 1009. However, because The Steel Company was in compliance with EPCRA at the time the suit was filed, the Court determined that CBE lacked standing to bring suit. See id.
193 See Citizens for a Better Env’t v. The Steel Co., 1999 WL 412439 (N.D. Ill. 1999). The district court utilized the Supreme Court’s language from their decision in this case on the merits: “[a]n interest in attorneys’ fees is ... insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.” 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1019 (1998). In the original case, the Supreme Court determined that no Article III case or controversy existed because there was no longer an EPCRA violation—thus, there would not be an Article III case or controversy to establish jurisdiction to determine attorneys’ fees. See Steel Co., 1999 WL 412439 at *2. The decision did not discuss The Steel Co.’s arguments on the merits. See id.
194 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 2.
195 See generally Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5.
196 See id. at 5–7. The Ninth Circuit case of Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Secretary of Interior, 748 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1984), which awarded attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendants whenever the defendant’s actions “substantially contributed” to the goals of the ESA, was recently held to no longer be good law by the Ninth Circuit based upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council. See 478 U.S. 546, 558–560 (1986); Marbled Murrlet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 182 F.3d 1091, 1094–1095 (9th Cir. 1999). Delaware Valley held that attorneys’ fees provisions in environmental statutes with similar language and purpose as the attorneys’ fees provision in the Civil Rights Acts should be interpreted in the same way. See 478 U.S. at 558–60. That case also clarified that the Christiansburg standard under the Civil Rights Act also applied to citizen suits arising under environmental legislation. See id.
197 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 7–12.
198 See id. at 3.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 5.
202 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 5.
203 See id.
204 See id. at 6; see also supra note 183 and accompanying text.
205 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 4.
206 See id; see also supra note 183 and accompanying text.
207 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 7–12.
208 See id.
209 See id. at 8.
210 See id. at 9–10.
211 Id.
212 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 9–10.
213 See id.
214 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
215 Compare Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420–423, with Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 10–12 (comparison showing the policy considerations at work in a civil rights case, and what defendants suggest is the policy consideration behind environmental citizen suits).
216 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 10.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 11. For example, CBE, who brought suit against The Steel Co., has over 30,000 members and 180,000 contributors. See id.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See Murrelet Amicus Brief, supra note 51; see also Marbled Murrelet, 182 F.3d at 1096.
226 Marbled Murrelet, 182 F.3d at 1096.
227 See supra notes 110–28 and accompanying text.
228 See id.
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 See generally S. Rep. No. 91–1196 (1970).
232 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686–94 (1983); Christiansburg v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418–23 (1978).
233 See id; see also supra notes 84–101 and accompanying text.
234 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 355-56.
235 See generally Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
236 See Murrelet Amicus Brief, supra note 51, at 32.
237 885 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Tex.) (1995).
238 See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Realty Inv. Ass’n, L.P., 524 F. Supp. 150, 152 (1981).
239 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 497.
240 See supra notes 110–20 and accompanying text.
241 See id.
242 See supra notes 51–87 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 33–47 and accompanying text; Nicyper, supra note 64, at 791–92.
244 See Axline, supra note 3, at 8–2.
245 See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text; Nicyper, supra note 64, at 791.
246 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 704 & n.14.
247 See supra notes 106–19 and accompanying text.
248 See id.
249 See supra notes 79–100 and accompanying text.
250 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 326–27 & n.91.
251 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 3.
252 See id.
253 See supra notes 156–67 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 139–68 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 157–68 and accompanying text.
256 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 497.
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 See id.
260 See supra notes 68–94 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 130–38, 142–56 and accompanying text.
262 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 6.
263 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 493.
264 See supra notes 110–28 and accompanying text.
265 See id.
266 See generally Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 412.
267 See S. Rep. No. 95–127, at 99 (1977); Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 1473 (1978).
268 See supra notes 87–118 and accompanying text.
269 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 354.
270 See supra notes 87–110 and accompanying text.
271 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
272 See id.
273 See id.
274 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 352; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 462 U.S. 424, 430–434 (1983).
275 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 357–58.
276 See id. at 356.
277 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 2-6.
278 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 685; see also supra notes 169–79 and accompanying text.
279 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 17, at 358.
280 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 680.
281 See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
282 See id.
283 See supra notes 68–94 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 110–20 and accompanying text.
285 See id.
286 See id.
287 See id.
288 See id.
289 See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 36–39 (1970).
290 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 687.
291 See Sierra Club v. Shell Oil, 817 F.2d 1169, 1176 (5th Cir. 1987); see also supra notes 106–28 and accompanying text.
292 See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 412.
293 See Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5, at 7–16.
294 See, e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. § §  7401–7671 (1994); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §  11046 (1994).
295 See Stephens, supra note 68, at 498; see also Axline, supra note 3, at 8–14 & n.64.
296 See supra notes 71–87 and accompanying text.
297 See, e.g., Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994). The Copyright Act states that “the court may ... award a reasonable attorneys’ fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” Id.
298 See generally Steel Co. Brief, supra note 5. Compare EPCRA, 42 U.S.C § 11046(f), with Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
299 See supra notes 130–38 and accompanying text.
300 Compare EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(f), with Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1994).